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Bitfinex is a crypto-currency exchange trading and currency-storage platform based out of Taiwan, owned and operated by iFinex Inc. Since 2014, it has been the largest Bitcoin exchange platform, with over 10% of the exchange's trading.
Problems in the last 24 hours
The graph below depicts the number of Bitfinex reports received over the last 24 hours by time of day. When the number of reports exceeds the baseline, represented by the red line, an outage is determined.
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Bitfinex Issues Reports
Latest outage, problems and issue reports in social media:
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DxM (@diopter_ring) reported@WuBlockchain Bitfinex down 59.7% is brutal rest of the market dipped but thats a straight cliff
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Dom's Crypto (@Doms_Crypto) reportedBitcoin has crashed = bears are happy BUT: bitcoin:native has printed same low on RSI14 level around ~12.00 - same as back on massive crash down to $60,000 (see on the second chart) An indecisive 4-hour candle printed which can bring buyers back into the game Bitfinex Longs going nuts
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Callistemon (@Callistemon25) reportedMarkets look rough today. Here's the chain: Iran threat escalates → oil surges above $90 → Fed hike bets reignite → crypto risk-off. $1B+ in liquidations, BTC back under $66K. The part most are missing: Bitfinex flagged BTC's bounce to $66,990 as thin positioning, not fresh capital. That matters going into a low-liquidity weekend. My move: holding current positions. Not from certainty, from a thesis that hasn't broken yet. Ask yourself the same this weekend. Not financial advice. #BTC #MarketRisk
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Samson Mow (@Excellion) reportedMany things in this post are incorrect, and it matters that we correct them, because this version of the history is exactly what convinced people the last few months were a good idea. “BIP-148 is celebrated as Bitcoin Independence Day, because it proved that ordinary users, running nodes in their homes, could force the most powerful mining cartels and corporations in the industry to back down. The users had no hashrate, no exchanges, no lobbyists. They had conviction and they had nodes, and that was enough.” First, the framing. August 1st is what's celebrated as Bitcoin Independence Day (I coined and popularized that term). August 1st was the flag day, and it commemorates the outcome the UASF threat produced, not BIP-148 itself. Second, BIP-148 was not just "ordinary users" running nodes at home. It was a cross section of the entire Bitcoin network, something a lot of BIP-110 supporters seem to disregard: developers, exchanges, wallets, miners, and mega whales, alongside ordinary users. Most important to understand is that BIP-148 and the small block camp carried a massive amount of economic weight. Chain split markets ran on @bitfinex through 2017, and outside of those markets I know of many OTC deals struck privately in whale groups to trade one side of a split against the other. There was skin in the game on both sides of the war, and huge amounts of BTC put on the line to show real conviction. This was as much an economic war as an ideological one, and that point is rarely acknowledged. Even the companies backing BIP-148 were taking real risk. BIP-148 was never merged into Bitcoin Core. Running it meant deliberately installing different software and accepting that if the UASF chain lost, you could be reorganized off the chain entirely. Bitmain spelled that scenario out themselves, calling it a wipe out, in the same post where they laid out their hard fork contingency. Dozens of companies committed anyway (BIP-110 supporters would likely call them suitcoiners today). On the topic of hashrate, BIP-148 had no version bit of its own. It required bit 1, which was BIP-141. So the accurate way to state it is that BIP-148/BIP-141 had 30-45% of hashrate behind it for most of its deployment window. During that time I was COO of BTCC, overseeing a mining pool that was the biggest one signaling SegWit. So the UASF threat had three components that made it credible: economic weight, hashrate, and nodes. BIP-110 only had nodes. That is UASF cosplay, not a real UASF. Another point to cover: Mechanic was spreading misinformation in Spaces (and likely other places) that BIP-148, a UASF, activated SegWit. That is false. It was technically BIP-91 that brought miners in line with BIP-141. BIP-148 was effectively frontrun and never had to be tested. So Bitcoin Independence Day, while celebrating the flag day deadline, is as much a celebration of BIP-91 as it is of BIP-148. So no, it was not just nodes and conviction. Just think about things rationally for a minute. Why would buying a node-in-a-box give you the right to dictate what anyone else on the network does, regardless of whether it's a miner or another user? Does buying two nodes-in-a-box give you that power? Of course not. Btw the whole plug-and-play node culture came after the Blocksize War. In 2015-2017 you just downloaded the software and ran it on your computer. Stay humble and stack sats, but also stay humble when people who lived through the history try to explain it to you.
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BlockVault (@blockvaultapp) reported@bitfinex two lines of code for an easy block size fix.
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₿arnabyTheStoic (@BarnabyTheStoic) reported@bitfinex Wtf are you thinking asking this
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Octopus (@Octop3s) reportedevery BIT exchange is shutting down. never see a world where Bitfinex would ever shut down. there’s just too much money in the reserves.
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~dorsen-witnes (@fazzam_eth) reportedReally strong stuff. There’s a lot of precedent for successfully navigating an event like this in defi. Bitfinex repaid 36% of customer assets in 8 months and came back stronger than before. Euler lost $197M, made everyone whole, and relaunched bigger than it ever was. Crypto doesn't punish teams for getting hit but for leaving holes. This is textbook comms so far.
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KhaiDao (@Khaikhaidao) reported@blockchainrptr bitfinex down 60% is brutal, ngl. liquidity following the flight to binance i guess.
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Coca Cola Kid (@CocaColaKid_OG) reportedBitfinex whale 24h pace down from ~+1,300 to +762, with a flat/negative last hour, could be top signal like projected ~88.4K BTC, +11%, day 18 last time it quit buying Bitcoin gained +20%
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Ari Paul (@AriDavidPaul) reported@nic_carter At least two of crypto’s biggest successful institutions were ponzis at points in time. Both seem today to have more than fully recovered their assets. With bitfinex-tether I think this is pretty public knowledge at this point: at one point bitfinex was insolvent and recapitalized with tether, and vice versa, so at various points each was in a ponzi state. But profits flowed, and all worked out. The principals wanted/hope for this to happen, rather than their customers eat the losses, their business fail, and possible criminal charges. IMO, this is all unethical and illegal, but…a lot less malicious and unethical than people who run ponzis intending to exit scam. The other example is more controversial - Binance. We know customer funds were transferred from the exchange to a private trading account and gambled with (on-chain forensics, public reporting). Presumably repaid later with winnings. Why did CZ do that? I assume the same reason he’s still running pumps and dumps as the world’s richest felon.
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Cryptocrat (@Cryptocratico) reported🚨 $167M BTC SHIFTS BETWEEN MAJOR EXCHANGES Approximately 2,572 BTC moved in two transactions from a Bitfinex-labeled hot wallet to Kraken-labeled addresses. This is a sizeable cross-exchange liquidity shift—not evidence of a sale. Customer withdrawals, custody, OTC settlement or liquidity management remain possible.
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Lain on the Blockchain (@CryptoCyberia) reported@colludingnode @satorinakamoto @0xCursr Kek cope It it public knowledge the feds pushed coinbase binance bitfinex etc to delist and Kracken told them ti **** off and they went to court against Kracken, as did EEA, UK and other feds. Really makes you wonder why theyre fine with zcash kek
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Rahul K (@iamrahulinc) reported🚨𝗔𝗥𝗚𝗘𝗡𝗧𝗜𝗡𝗘 𝗝𝗨𝗗𝗚𝗘 𝗙𝗥𝗘𝗘𝗭𝗘𝗦 𝟮𝟱 𝗟𝗜𝗕𝗥𝗔‑𝗥𝗘𝗟𝗔𝗧𝗘𝗗 𝗔𝗖𝗖𝗢𝗨𝗡𝗧𝗦! Federal judge Marcelo Martínez de Giorgi ordered the seizure of 25 crypto wallets linked to the LIBRA investigation. He instructed Binance, Bybit, OKX, CoinEx, FixedFloat and Bitfinex to provide user KYC, IP login data, associated bank accounts and complete transaction histories. Police report that the money flowed from “Team Libra Wallets” across several blockchains and centralized exchanges, using split transfers to mask its path. $BTC
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EyeOnChain (@EyeOnChain) reportedAbraxas Capital isn't slowing down its ETH buying. Over the past 7 hours, Abraxas Capital has withdrawn more than 15,477 ETH, worth over $29.88 million, from major exchanges. That brings its total ETH accumulation over the past week to more than 48,996 ETH, valued at over $88 million, withdrawn from Binance, Bybit, and Bitfinex. The steady stream of exchange withdrawals suggests Abraxas continues to aggressively accumulate ETH rather than keeping it on trading platforms.
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Matt Chad (@mattymaddog_89) reported@bitfinex Before your hair cut where you rugged me 60% of my BTC holdings because you got “hacked” **** you I’ll never forget
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Skin In The Game (@SITGnews) reportedBitcoin faces a key inflation test this week as key support levels near $60K are watched closely by Fidelity and Bitfinex. CryptoQuant warns the bear cycle may not be over.
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Seabass On-Chain (@SeabassCity) reported@CryptoGirlNova @bitfinex Chances are degens are too slow to understand macro factors
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CryptoJGM (@CryptoJM95) reported🚨SOMEONE JUST OPENED A $16,000,000 $XRP LONG. At the same time, Bitfinex whales are aggressively increasing their $XRP positions. Wtf is going on???
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HypeDojo (@HypeDojo) reported> Coinbase down. > Binance down. > Bitfinex down. Hyperliquid remained online. Market participants don't care about promises during bull markets.They care about performance when everyone shows up at once.
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Vasantha B Eshwaragere (@Soaper_Pan) reportedHonestly didn't expect tokenized exposure to MSTR and Metaplanet to hit Bitfinex Securities this fast. Feels like the bridge between BTC treasury plays and onchain access is finally clicking. Would you actually buy these? #Bitcoin
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clav (@marsclavie) reportedthe timeline is suddenly full of XPL bull posts a month before one of the biggest unlocks relative to float in crypto history. funny timing @plasma here's why it's one of the worst-structured tokens in crypto. with receipts. the setup was perfect. tether and bitfinex behind it. founders fund. $373m committed to a $50m public sale, 7x oversubscribed. $2b of stablecoins on chain on day one. ath $1.68. twelve months later: $0.087. ten straight red monthly candles. back to the launch-day open. –94%. the chain: tvl from $5.7b in week one to $624m today. stablecoins on chain from 2b to 838m. fees: ~$830 a day. about $300k a year against an $870m fdv. that's not a bug. it's the design. zero-fee usdt means the core use case is structurally unmonetizable. every dollar of "adoption" produces nothing for the token. they built the one l1 that can't capture value from its own success. staking was promised for q1 2026. it's august 31. not live. no date. holders are just exit liq. meanwhile their own supply api shows 10.12b+ xpl, over 125m minted beyond genesis, while their docs say inflation "only activates when external validators and stake delegation go live." explain that one. tokenomics: 10b supply, 18% floated at launch. 25% team, 25% investors, one-year cliff. sept 25: 833m team + 833m investors + 89m ecosystem = 1.76b tokens in one day. 63% of the float. then 228m a month, 5% of float, until september 2028. the most circulated bull report, written by a disclosed plasma investor, models the cliff at "roughly 830 million tokens." official docs: 833m team and 833m investors. 1.67b. off by half, in a report about token demand. retweeted by the team. "look guys, this is why you buy xpl!" lmao. plasma one, "the world's first stablecoin-native neobank." their own data: 78,400 "cards." median balance under $1. one wallet holds 11% of all deposits. $17.9m total. 61 app store ratings. revolut has 75m customers and $6b in revenue. this is a dune dashboard with a visa logo. the card pays cashback in xpl. a token down 94%. every reward is a bag. platinum requires locking 100,000 xpl, about $8.5k, for a year. their own bull case admits the flywheel "partially throttles itself": token goes up, the lock costs more; token goes down, you're stuck in it. unit economics: 3–4% cashback against 2–3% interchange. their own investor report concedes they "may lose a little on each transaction." lock demand: ~33m xpl a month. vesting supply after sept 25: ~228m a month. seven to one. before the cliff. cmon bros. this playbook ran before. CRO: lock the token, get a metal card, 19x in 2021. rewards got cut, round-tripped 90%. plasma copied it, made the lock harder to enter, and launched it three months before the biggest unlock in the token's life. no CRO action, just dilution and holders crying. august had record binance spot volume, 12.75b xpl, 4.6x the float. looked like accumulation. it was a binance trading tournament. 4m xpl in vouchers. they paid for volume while the token sat at the bottom. october 2025, the founder: "no team members have sold any xpl." june 2026: wallets labeled plasma team moved 150m xpl to binance, flagged by onchain lens. august 2026: plasma-linked wallets depositing again, three weeks before 833m team tokens unlock. maybe it's market-making. they haven't said a word. same month: ethena bought out its selling investors and put a fee switch to a vote. +100%. monad offered to buy out early investors. pumpfun spent $350m on buybacks and ripped straight through its own cliff. plasma ran a trading competition. the stablecoin thesis is the best thesis in crypto. stablecoins settled $33t last year. the demand is real, in lagos and buenos aires and istanbul, and someone will build the rail. plasma had tether, thiel, and $373m of demand on day one. they built a token dispenser. im not buying the dip. i don’t want it. not because the idea was wrong. because they made it about themselves and not the holders. zero
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Victor (@gvictor808) reported@ProofOfMoney Bitcoin custodian (and exchange) failures form a long-running pattern of hacks, key mismanagement, fraud, and insolvency that has repeatedly locked or destroyed customer funds. These are not isolated events. Centralized platforms holding private keys create single points of failure—whether technical, operational, or human. Major Historical Failures Platform Year Estimated Loss Primary Cause Notes Mt. Gox 2014 ~850,000 BTC Prolonged security breach / poor controls Once handled >70% of global BTC volume. Bankruptcy; partial creditor repayments began years later and continued into 2025–2026. Net unrecovered portion still very large. Bitfinex 2016 119,756 BTC Multi-signature wallet vulnerability Significant hot-wallet/security failure. QuadrigaCX 2019 ~76,000 BTC + other assets Founder death + sole key control / alleged fraud Canadian exchange; Gerald Cotten held sole access to cold wallets. Funds largely inaccessible. Celsius 2022 Several billion USD Insolvency / risky lending Withdrawal freeze then bankruptcy after market downturn. FTX 2022 ~$8 billion shortfall Fraud (customer funds diverted to Alameda) One of the largest exchange collapses. Bankruptcy proceedings later recovered substantial value; some creditor classes received >100% of petition-date claims due to market recovery and asset management. Other notable cases include Prime Trust (2023) and related entities such as Fortress Trust, which faced insolvency, lost access to wallets/keys, and allegedly used customer funds improperly to cover shortfalls. Broader Context and Patterns •Hacks remain common (e.g., Bybit’s large 2025 incident involving ~$1.4–1.5 billion, primarily ETH, attributed to sophisticated attackers exploiting operational processes). •Key management failures (lost or inaccessible private keys) and commingling/misuse of customer assets appear repeatedly. •Insolvency cascades in 2022 (Celsius, Voyager, BlockFi, Genesis, FTX) showed how lending and leverage amplify risks when platforms treat customer deposits as their own capital. •Recovery is often slow and incomplete. Mt. Gox creditors waited a decade-plus; FTX moved faster with better asset recovery but still involved multi-year processes and frozen access during bankruptcy. Independent archives tracking custody access failures (including exchange lockouts, inheritance issues, and operational barriers) document hundreds of cases, with a high percentage of known outcomes ending in blocked or constrained access for legitimate owners or heirs. Key Lessons Custodial arrangements introduce counterparty risk: you rely on the platform’s security, honesty, solvency, and operational competence. History shows these can fail catastrophically even at large, seemingly reputable firms. Self-custody eliminates that counterparty risk but shifts responsibility to the individual (seed phrase security, device integrity, inheritance planning, etc.). Hybrid approaches (e.g., multisig with careful key distribution) aim to balance the two. The repeated failures reinforce the core Bitcoin principle: not your keys, not your coins. Platforms can and do lose or lock customer Bitcoin through negligence, theft, or deliberate misuse.
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Crypto Noob (@cryptonoobini) reported@bitfinex capital settling in utility says more than a meme spike slow money sticking around is the real tell
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Ratih (@Ratih94357237) reported@bitfinex @WDK_tether @utexocom Any WDK wallet can access RGB issuance on Bitcoin and payments on Lightning without building the stack. It is painful to see how much infrastructure still needs to ship, but progress matters. What will you build next? 😔⚡
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SANDY.CRYPTOMAN (@SanMSH21) reported$Bitcoin ----Most Costly Mistakes The $44 Billion Bithumb Blunder (2026) A Bithumb employee accidentally sent 620,000 BTC instead of 2,000 Korean Won to users, forcing a massive, near-total network rollback and asset freeze. $44.000 Billion — Bithumb Error (2026) $9.000 Billion Mt. Gox Repayment Move (2024) $3.600 Billion DOJ Bitfinex Seizure (2022) $1.000 Billion DOJ Silk Road Move (2020) $0.003 B. Record Transaction Fee ($3.1M in 2023) $0.001 Billion Paxos Overpayment ($510,000 in 2023)
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ArsObKSC (@DereckWDew) reported@GavinMehl It stinks of desperation. The only involvement Craig would have because that he created bitcoin. This seems like Bitfinex oh, **** let's get them before it all implodes move—un tethered or micropenis strategy
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Giacomo ShadowUNbanned Zucco (@giacomozucco) reported@gegelsmr4 Interestingly enough, this (interesting) ethical problem is only practically relevant if you are going to send the feds after them. Which is a retarded thing to do anyway, since the feds steal much more money (with violence and guns, not "finding" it) and even if they caught the attackers would keep the loot for themselves (cf Bitfinex). So it's a theoretically important question which cyphertank theory makes irrelevant: just make your keys hard to find.
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EddieOz ⚡ (@eddieoz) reportedWhen block size warz in 2017, bcashers tried the BCC tckr. But Bitfinex was using BCH. Some say it was Bitcoin Cash, but others say it was for *******. Well, we know. That matters: if 110ers try to list their shitcoin, it is up to the exchanges to decide. CSW feelings.
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Slevin Kelevra ✡︎ ☦︎ (@kruper47) reportedSometimes we'll dive into history to better understand market context. Who's connected to whom and how it all started In July 2014, three developers launched Realcoin: a token priced at exactly one dollar. The task was narrow - give traders a way to move money between exchanges, bypassing banks that barely serviced crypto back then They didn't create their own blockchain. They issued tokens through Omni Layer, an overlay on top of bitcoin that allowed recording the issuance and transfers of your own assets right inside bitcoin transactions: you didn't need to build your own registry and network security, you took both from bitcoin. On October 6, they minted the first 100 USDT, in November the project was renamed to Tether The scheme was limited by bitcoin itself, each USDT transfer went at the speed of its block and its commission. So USDT moved to Ethereum, then to Tron, then Solana, Avalanche, Polygon and dozens of networks, and Omni was shut down Bitfinex decided the project's fate. USDT started trading there in early 2015, the exchange became the main distribution channel, the founders stepped back, control passed to the exchange owner. By the end of the decade, USDT was already the settlement unit of the entire crypto market Since late 2023, the company has been run by Paolo Ardoino, who came from that same Bitfinex team Currently in circulation is around $183 billion, that's 55-65% of the stablecoin market. Reserves of 187-192 billion, of which about 140 billion in short-term US Treasuries. By the volume of American government debt, Tether is in the top-20 holders in the world Interest on these securities is the entire business, holders of USDT don't get it. $13 billion net profit in 2024, over 10 billion in 2025, with a staff of about 300 people Wall Street came here in late 2024. The old New York investment bank Cantor Fitzgerald bought rights to about 5% of Tether for 600 million, when the entire company was valued at 12 billion. Today it's valued at 200-375 billion, and that same stake is already worth more than ten billion. Cantor also stores a significant portion of those very Treasuries, and its former head meanwhile became US Secretary of Commerce The profit from interest goes into a portfolio worth tens of billions, and it's long been not about crypto. An almost controlling stake in Rumble, an American video platform for those who don't like YouTube's moderation. Control in a South American agro-holding that grows sugar cane and rice. Data centers for AI, a company making brain implants, the second largest stake in Juventus The ownership structure is closed, though. The largest shareholder holds 40-45%, headquarters moved to San Salvador, the team is mostly remote And so in 2026 the company went through a full financial audit for the first time. Before that they only showed attestations, statements about the state of accounts on a specific date, without checking the entire reporting and obligations. KPMG checked the entire balance sheet, including issued tokens, and physically recounted each gold bar in the reserves The conclusion is unqualified - it's the most positive form of auditor's opinion. As of the end of 2025, reserves exceed liabilities by $6.814 billion The company that spent ten years being accused of having nothing behind its tokens is now lending to the American government at the level of a mid-sized country