AOL outages and service status in Denham Springs, Louisiana

Problems in the last 24 hours in Denham Springs, Louisiana

The chart below shows the number of AOL reports we have received in the last 24 hours from users in Denham Springs, Louisiana and surrounding areas. An outage is declared when the number of reports exceeds the baseline, represented by the red line.

Community Discussion

Tips? Frustrations? Share them here. Useful comments include a description of the problem, city and postal code.

Beware of "support numbers" or "recovery" accounts that might be posted below. Make sure to report and downvote those comments. Avoid posting your personal information.

AOL Issues Reports

Latest outage, problems and issue reports in social media:

• 
  Roy Mueller (@RoyMueller13) reported 2 minutes ago

  @Irina_exh 18. Never had an AOL address and never had a walkman

• 
  Recon Number 54 (@Recon_Number_54) reported 2 minutes ago

  @NilesSankey The Bungie of my memories was (as you say) a once in a lifetime confluence of people and a particular time in the world. I remember when they were a "keyword" on AOL (before AOL had full Internet access, sort of like a link) and fans were also prevalent on UseNet. This time (and the decade after) was when the fans and the devs had such tight contact that everyone was "in on the joke" when The Webmaster, Disembodied Soul or other online "persona" would rib, tease, or outright insult gamers. Not as if they were family, because they WERE family. It was great while it lasted, but things inevitably change and more and more gamers started considering themselves "customers" and that Bungie should treat them as such ("the customer is always right" mantra for example). The playful and sometimes hardcore "back and forth" went away. The tight connection between the devs and their fans became customer service interactions with consumers. People were told "It's not 2004 anymore" and the fact is that they were right. The era had passed and something new/different had replaced everything. That carefree, brave, willing to take risks, adventurous outlook of a tightly knit team isn't something that can be forced and it isn't likely to survive current-day corporate culture. It's not 1994, 2004, or even 2014 anymore. But it WAS fun!

• 
  Scott Herring (@ScottHe69960638) reported 3 minutes ago

  I managed to post a few photos in spite of the bad internet (for some reason, X/Twitter works much better than anything associated with Google; here in Gardiner, Google is like that 2004 AOL I was talking about earlier). Here's the view to the east, up the Yellowstone River canyon. The terrain to the right of the river is Yellowstone NP.

• 
  ramzy (@0xRamzy) reported 8 minutes ago

  AOL paid $165 billion to win Time Warner in 2000 and wrote off $99 billion of it two years later. A quiet Yale lecture from 2007 proves the same mechanic that killed that deal is silently draining money from every homebuyer, every hiring manager, and every person who has ever won an eBay auction. The lecture is part of the free game theory course Yale posted online. The professor teaches with a hundred undergraduates and a piece of chalk. No slides, no textbook required. His name is Ben Polak. He ran Yale's economics department, was later made Provost of the university, and spent fifteen years teaching this same course to a lecture hall of students paying $60,000 a year for seats a stranger with an internet connection could sit in for free. The idea has a name. The winner's curse. It was first identified in a 1971 paper by three oil engineers at Atlantic Richfield who had noticed something odd about their industry. Every major oil company in America was bidding on offshore drilling rights in the Gulf of Mexico. They all had geologists and the same maps. The winner of each lease, on average, was losing money on the field. The engineers proved that when everyone estimates the same object with roughly equal error, the person who wins is almost always the one who over-estimated the most. Winning was proof of being wrong. The check they wrote was the receipt. The full lecture fits into three sentences. If you and a room full of reasonable people are all bidding for the same thing, your best estimate of it is almost certainly too high. If it were low, you would not be the one winning. The number of losers you beat is information about how wrong you are. Polak's summary is one line: shade your bid. Not because you are stupid. Because winning is the strongest signal in the market that you paid too much. Concrete case: a young couple bids on a three-bedroom house against fourteen other offers in a hot April market. They win at $80,000 over asking. They feel triumphant for one week. Two years later three of the losing bidders have bought the same style house on the same street for $60,000 less. The couple never sees a "for sale" sign. They just have a mortgage that eats every raise for the next decade. Every buyer who has ever won a house at $30,000 over the second-highest offer paid $29,999 more than the market thought it was worth. Every hiring manager who beat two other companies to a candidate is paying the number that was too high for two other adults. Every free-agent contract in sports that "shocks the league" was set by the one general manager who was most optimistic in the room. The lecture is on YouTube. Yale posted it in 2007. Almost none of the millions who have watched it ever shaded a bid on the next thing they wanted. The math is free. Bidding a little less than you feel like on the next thing you want to win is the entire edge. ↓

• 
  Kathleen Lenkeit voted for Hillary, Joe, & Kamala (@KathleenLenkeit) reported 10 minutes ago

  @Sheldon_305 19 - never on AOL

• 
  Steven Harris 💹🧲🇬🇱🇩🇰🇺🇦 (@steev5ten) reported 11 minutes ago

  @Irina_exh never had AOL

• 
  Greg Steiner (@gsteiner1031) reported 14 minutes ago

  @Irina_exh 19, never had an AOL address

• 
  BookemCodeMonkey (@CodeMonkeyReadr) reported 14 minutes ago

  @omgsidewalks AOL was horrible

• 
  Scottx70 (@scottx70) reported 14 minutes ago

  @CJGRISHAM Courtesy of Larry Johnson STFU Here is the heart of the problem. The Combat Logistics Force today numbers about 34 ships — a figure that has stayed essentially flat for well over a decade. On paper, stability. In practice, a slow hollowing, because the demands on that force have grown while its most capable ships have disappeared. Around 2010, the Navy operated all four of its Supply-class fast combat support ships. Today only two remain. In the mid-2010s the Navy inactivated two of them into reserve to save roughly $30 million a year each in operating costs — a decision that looked reasonable on a spreadsheet and looks indefensible from the deck of a hungry ship. The reason it bites is arithmetic: replacing the combined capability of one fast support ship typically takes an oiler plus a dry cargo ship — two hulls, two crews, two schedules — to move the fuel, ammo, and food that one ship used to carry in a single package. Cut the fast support fleet in half and every sustained single-carrier mission becomes harder to feed. The rest of the force is aging underneath the flat headline. The Henry J. Kaiser-class oilers that form the backbone date to the 1980s and are being retired faster than their replacements arrive. The new John Lewis-class oiler program is meant to recapitalize the fleet with some twenty ships, but the lead ship only delivered in 2022 and just one was fully operational by mid-2025. The Navy’s own newer answer — a smaller, more numerous “light replenishment oiler,” the T-AOL — does not begin construction until FY2027 and will not arrive in numbers until the 2030s. The analytic consensus across defense researchers is blunt: the logistics force is not enough, and not fast enough, for the demands now being placed on it.

• 
  patriotic_canadian (@GKomus79144) reported 15 minutes ago

  @Reil76 damn.. another part of pop culture gone i still have an aol disc mobile somewhere