Namecheap status: hosting issues and outage reports

Problems in the last 24 hours

The graph below depicts the number of Namecheap reports received over the last 24 hours by time of day. When the number of reports exceeds the baseline, represented by the red line, an outage is determined.

Most Reported Problems

The following are the most recent problems reported by Namecheap users through our website.

• Domains (50%)
• Hosting (50%)

Live Outage Map

The most recent Namecheap outage reports came from the following cities:

City	Problem Type	Report Time
Tuxtla	Domains	2 months ago
Centerville	Hosting	2 months ago
Noida	Domains	2 months ago
Purmerend	Domains	2 months ago
Istanbul	Hosting	2 months ago
Charleston	Hosting	2 months ago

Full Outage Map

Community Discussion

Tips? Frustrations? Share them here. Useful comments include a description of the problem, city and postal code.

Beware of "support numbers" or "recovery" accounts that might be posted below. Make sure to report and downvote those comments. Avoid posting your personal information.

Namecheap Issues Reports

Latest outage, problems and issue reports in social media:

• 
  Lg Shurley (@SurelyLg) reported 1 minute ago

  @Namecheap #namecheap lost thousands of dollars today due to bad business. They refused to refund a purchase they made a mistake on. This violates a sacred covenant between business & customer. They are unethical and have forgotten what it means to appreciate a customer.#ethics

• 
  Today in Bitcoin History (@daily_btc_lore) reported 3 minutes ago

  3/7 - The bold part was zero-confirmation delivery. A Bitcoin payment isn't settled until miners include it in a block, roughly 10 minutes at best. Most merchants waited for one to six confirmations. Namecheap activated your purchase the moment the transaction hit the network.

• 
  Luca Capone | Vibe Coder (@LucaCaponeX) reported 3 minutes ago

  @buildwithmaya @Namecheap Namecheap funded a whole graveyard of my half-built ideas. Buying the domain takes 5 minutes. Shipping the actual thing is where I disappear for 3 months. The domain was never the hard part.

• 
  Max Builds (@MaxBuildsBuiz) reported 5 minutes ago

  @omarvvvr I trust namecheap the most, been using it for a while and never had any problems

• 
  Raunak Yadush (@raunak_yadush) reported 5 minutes ago

  * Claude = coding. ($20/mo) * Supabase = backend. (Free) * Vercel = deployment. (Free) * Namecheap = domain. ($12/yr) * Stripe = payments. (2.9% per transaction) * GitHub = version control. (Free) * Resend = email delivery. (Free) * Clerk = authentication. (Free) * Cloudflare = DNS. (Free) * PostHog = analytics. (Free) * Sentry = error monitoring. (Free) * Upstash = Redis. (Free) * Pinecone = vector database. (Free) Total monthly cost to run a startup: around $20. There has never been a more affordable time to build.

• 
  Bill Hartzer (@bhartzer) reported 7 minutes ago

  @DNaccess analyzed their list of hundreds of stolen domain names (mostly publicly announced stolen domains and many not publicly disclosed). We looked at historical whois data that shows the losing registrar in each of the stolen domain name cases. Here's the breakdown of the percentages (and where you probably should secure your account if you have domains registered there): Network Solutions is 40%, GoDaddy 33%, and eNom 7% — so those three alone account for 80%, and Network Solutions plus GoDaddy together are 73%. After that it drops into a long tail: Domain(.com) ~4%, then Moniker, Namecheap, and 1&1 IONOS at ~2% each, and a scattering of single cases at ~1% We're not necessarily suggesting or recommending that you transfer your domain name to another registrar. Just secure your account. Also note that these are among the largest and oldest registrars, and Network Solutions in particular holds a big share of the premium legacy .com names that thieves target, so this reflects where the valuable domains live as much as where security is weakest. #domains

• 
  Ajetomobi Jamiu (@JamiuAjetomobi) reported 10 minutes ago

  It doesn't matter how great your content or product is if your audience never sees it. ​The fix requires updating your technical security keys inside your domain host (like @GoDaddy or @Namecheap) so providers know you are a trusted sender.

• 
  OneAndOnlyAarav (@WaterAarav) reported 11 minutes ago

  Claude = coding. ($20/mo) Shypmenta = deploys, connects, and manages every platform below. Basically your Cursor for shipping.($6/mo) Supabase = backend. (Free) Vercel = deploying. (Free) Namecheap = domain. ($12/yr) Stripe = payments. (2.9%/transaction) GitHub = version control. (Free) Resend = emails. (Free) Clerk = auth. (Free) Cloudflare = DNS. (Free) PostHog = analytics. (Free) Sentry = error tracking. (Free) Upstash = Redis. (Free) Pinecone = vector DB. (Free) Total monthly cost to run a startup: ~$20. Building has genuinely never been this affordable, and rarely this effortless either.

• 
  Chris Seltzer (@ChrisSeltzer) reported 14 minutes ago

  @neerajjj6785 Really depends on what you're using it for and where your stuff will be hosted. If you're using a platform like AWS then buying it through them can save you some headaches down the line. Otherwise I've always used Namecheap but heard good things about Cloudflare.

• 
  CAPED CRUSADER🦇 (@stilleclectic) reported 14 minutes ago

  @matthansbello Sigh, everything was originally done on namecheap but I’ve now just moved the dns to cloudflare. Waiting to see if that fixes the issue

• 
  Harish Bhatt (@heyharishbhatt) reported 16 minutes ago

  - Claude = coding. ($20/mo) - Supabase = backend. (Free) - Vercel = deploying. (Free) - Namecheap = domain. ($12/yr) - Stripe = payments. (2.9%/transaction) - GitHub = version control. (Free) - Resend = emails. (Free) - Clerk = auth. (Free) - Cloudflare = DNS. (Free) - PostHog = analytics. (Free) - Sentry = error tracking. (Free) - Upstash = Redis. (Free) - Pinecone = vector DB. (Free) Total monthly cost to run a startup: ~$20 There has never been a cheaper time to build.

• 
  Lg Shurley (@SurelyLg) reported 18 minutes ago

  @Namecheap #namecheap lost a thousands of dollars today due to bad business. They refused to refund a purchase they made a mistake on. This violates a sacred covenant between business & customer. They are unethical and have forgotten what it means to appreciate a customer.#ethics

• 
  Vivek Teegalapally (@vivekteega) reported 18 minutes ago

  @prbhtkumr @Namecheap I am still trying to understand, what is the issue that makes you say that?

• 
  Saint (@stjpg_) reported 21 minutes ago

  @guillemcraft Also FastVPN (basically namecheap VPN service) offer 1 year VPN for ~$12.

• 
  Sanvi Rathore (@sanvi280304) reported 23 minutes ago

  Has anyone used namecheap here, dm if you have I need help.

• 
  🛡️Shir Khorshid Noor Cyber Unit🛡️ (@FriendOfTheInst) reported 32 minutes ago

  Sponsored search results are not a trust boundary. A fake ChatGPT download campaign used brand impersonation, malvertising, shared-link abuse, cloaking, platform-specific payloads, CAPTCHA gating, Electron packaging, JavaScript obfuscation, and staged execution to deliver malware to Windows and macOS users. This is not merely another fake download page. It is a clear demonstration of how attackers exploit trust across multiple layers: • Trusted brand • Trusted search flow • Trusted-looking ad placement • Trusted-looking domain patterns • Trusted UI/branding • Trusted installer frameworks • Trusted code-signing assumptions • Trusted AI platform sharing features What happened: Attackers promoted a fake OpenAI/ChatGPT download experience using the domain: openew[.]app The site copied OpenAI-style branding and offered download paths for: • Windows • macOS • Chrome extension The Chrome extension path linked to a legitimate ChatGPT-related extension, further increasing perceived legitimacy. The Windows and macOS download paths delivered malware. Attackers also abused legitimate ChatGPT shared conversation links, including chatgpt[.]com/s/ pages, to host fake outage or download pages. A link hosted on a trusted domain can still deliver attacker-controlled content to users. The campaign employed cloaking and conditional rendering: automated scanners and analysis tools were shown benign content, reportedly an unrelated AR/VR company site, while real browsers received the malicious ChatGPT-themed download experience. That is the key lesson: A trusted domain, HTTPS padlock, sponsored ad, or polished UI does not equal a safe download. Why this campaign matters: Victims were not browsing dark web forums or downloading cracks. They were searching for a legitimate AI tool. That is why malvertising is effective: it targets high-intent users at the exact moment they are ready to install software. The campaign turned normal user behavior into an initial access path. Windows chain: The Windows payload was distributed as: Chat_GPT.exe Reported SHA-256: 56CC26E88C064B0C423AA8AD6530E58F91D1E4D28FAB1A8BCEDEF16A6582B4D2 Additional reported Windows hash: c9e0e6985dca3a179c9bdea4e7b38f7dc57fe00ecedc2fd634256fc53bf2de2d Important: hashes are useful for triage, not sufficient for defense. Campaigns rotate samples. Hunt behaviorally. Windows technical observations: • Installer built with Inno Setup • Electron-based application • Chromium runtime components • resources\app.asar archive • Large obfuscated JavaScript payload identified as winter.js • Hex-encoded strings • Dynamically resolved functions • Control-flow obfuscation • Event-driven execution • CAPTCHA gating before core behavior • Inner Electron payload (App.exe) launched after installation • PowerShell spawned after CAPTCHA completion Observed PowerShell pattern: -ExecutionPolicy Unrestricted -Command - That trailing dash matters. It suggests commands may be supplied through standard input rather than appearing directly in the process command line. This reduces the value of command-line-only detection and makes process-tree and behavioral monitoring much more important. Static red flags: The filename suggested ChatGPT, but embedded metadata reportedly identified the installer as: PovariEGLESVapp Setup The executable was signed by: F.F.A.P. Hurkmans Beheer B.V. That publisher does not align with OpenAI or ChatGPT. Important reminder: a valid code signature does not mean software is safe. It only confirms that the file was signed by a certificate and has not been modified since signing. It does not establish that the software is legitimate or authorized by the brand it imitates. Additional Windows indicators: • App.exe SHA-256: D9AD44D43E57B870793FA5CF7FB3A813990D0CBD0C7087BDE70A5E61FB1F1FE6 • Unexpected Chromium/Electron profile: %APPDATA%\Satoshi • Additional reported path: %APPDATA%\LeronApplication • Reported Electron/Node capabilities: systeminformation, child_process, os, fs, zip-lib, Those modules indicate a capable execution environment: system discovery, file access, archive handling, process execution, and network communication. macOS chain: The macOS payload was delivered as: ChatGpt.dmg Reported SHA-256: 7E5B708F6659B1FAD3AAE7B589A706434FBF21708AEEC5AF5910189B96E25FEF Additional reported macOS hash: c0919e1999eaee67e67aeda0287722775afb04e9a9a0f727928b4d11265fb70b The macOS malware is reported as Odyssey Stealer, a fork of AMOS / Atomic Stealer. Reported macOS targeting includes: • Browser passwords • Browser cookies • Saved logins • macOS keychain data • Telegram sessions • Cryptocurrency wallet directories • Desktop/Documents files with sensitive wallet/key extensions • Ledger Live • Trezor Suite • Exodus • Electrum • Sparrow The most dangerous macOS behavior: Wallet replacement. The malware reportedly attempts to replace legitimate wallet-related applications with trojanized versions. That means a victim may later open what appears to be their normal wallet app, but actually launch an attacker-controlled version. That is not only credential theft. That is long-tail financial compromise. Infrastructure: Reported malicious domain: openew[.]app Reported infrastructure includes: 144[.]172[.]104[.]205 188[.]137[.]246[.]189 192[.]253[.]248[.]181 172[.]94[.]9[.]250 Infrastructure notes: • Recently registered domain • Namecheap / registrar-servers infrastructure reported • RouterHosting infrastructure reported • Passive DNS linked infrastructure to other suspicious or malicious domains • .app domains require HTTPS, so browsers show a padlock The padlock only means the connection is encrypted. It does not mean the site is legitimate. Detection opportunities for defenders: 1. Newly created executables launched from Downloads, Temp, or other user-writable paths 2. Trusted-brand filenames that do not match embedded metadata 3. Installer publisher mismatch: filename says ChatGPT, signer is unrelated 4. Electron apps spawning scripting engines: powershell.exe cmd.exe osascript bash sh zsh 5. PowerShell with: -ExecutionPolicy Unrestricted -Command - 6. Unexpected Chromium/Electron profile directories, such as: %APPDATA%\Satoshi %APPDATA%\LeronApplication or other anomalous Electron profile paths 7. app.asar archives containing large obfuscated JavaScript bundles 8. CAPTCHA or user-interaction gating before malicious behavior 9. Newly registered domains impersonating major software or AI vendors 10. Users installing software from ads instead of official vendor channels 11. Suspicious wallet-app replacement attempts on macOS 12. Post-install network traffic to low-cost VPS infrastructure 13. Legitimate AI sharing URLs that render fake support, outage, update, or installation pages 14. Download pages that show different content to scanners than to real browsers The key defensive point: Do not build detections only around hashes or static strings. This campaign reduces the value of static analysis through: • Obfuscation • Runtime string construction • CAPTCHA gating • Electron packaging • Conditional execution • Cloaking • Staged payload behavior • Shared-link abuse on trusted domains The better approach: • Behavioral detection • Process-tree monitoring • Parent-child process analysis • Script-engine execution monitoring • Browser/download source telemetry • Application control • Newly registered domain monitoring • Publisher and metadata validation • EDR detections for Electron-to-shell execution • Monitoring for AI-platform shared links used as delivery pages • User training focused on sponsored-result and fake-download risk For users: Only download ChatGPT from official OpenAI channels or the Microsoft Store. Do not install software from ads, mirror sites, download portals, unfamiliar domains, or fake support/outage pages. If you installed a “ChatGPT” app from an ad or unfamiliar page: Use a clean device and: • Sign out everywhere from important accounts • Change passwords, starting with primary email • Rotate API keys, SSH keys, cloud credentials, and tokens • Revoke active sessions for email, GitHub, cloud, Discord, Telegram, crypto exchanges, banking, and password managers • Move crypto funds from a clean device • Do not open Ledger/Trezor apps on a potentially infected Mac • Monitor financial accounts • Reinstall the OS • Notify IT/security immediately if it was a work device For AI vendors and platform owners: This is now part of the product security perimeter. Brand impersonation, malicious search ads, fake download pages, clone domains, and abuse of shared AI content are active distribution channels. Practical controls: • Make official download links easy to find • Monitor sponsored ads for brand abuse • Monitor newly registered lookalike domains • Detect abuse of shared-content features • Run takedowns quickly • Publish clear download guidance • Provide signed-installer verification guidance • Coordinate with search/ad platforms • Alert users when major impersonation campaigns are active Bottom line: Attackers are not just exploiting ChatGPT. They are exploiting the trust, urgency, and confusion around fast-moving AI adoption. Today it is ChatGPT. Yesterday it was another AI tool. Tomorrow it will be the next trending product. The malware can rotate. The domain can rotate. The payload can rotate. The brand can rotate. The infrastructure can rotate. The defensive mindset must rotate too: From: “Is this file known bad?” To: “Is this behavior legitimate for this software, this publisher, this user, this source, and this execution context?” That is the difference between signature-based reaction and modern detection engineering. Analysis draws on reporting from Malwarebytes Labs, Evalian SOC, Push Security, BleepingComputer, CybersecurityNews, and OpenAI documentation. #CyberSecurity #Malvertising #ThreatIntelligence

• 
  Edgex (@SahilExec) reported 34 minutes ago

  @neerajjj6785 I’ve stuck with Namecheap for years, cheap, easy UI and solid support.

• 
  Kirtesh (@AKirtesh) reported 36 minutes ago

  My current indie hacker stack in 2026: - Claude for Coding - Stripe for Payments - GitHub for Version Control - Vercel for Deployment - Supabase for Backend - Clerk for Auth - Upstash for Redis - Pinecone for Vector DB - Resend for Emails - Namecheap for Domain - Cloudflare for DNS - PostHog for Analytics - Sentry for Error Tracking You can build and ship a complete startup from your bedroom in 2026. The barrier has never been lower 💪

• 
  Domayn Kapital (@domaynkapital) reported 36 minutes ago

  @Namecheap every few weeks there's a domain I win with non-functioning namerservers. 3-4 times in the last months. I contact support and they tell gaslight me telling me it's all fine. Waste 30 minutes until they call a specialist to fixt it. Please deal with this.

• 
  The Smart Ape 🔥 (@the_smart_ape) reported 37 minutes ago

  millions of companies forget to renew their domain names every year. you can just buy the expired domain someone forgot about and get a premium on it. it’s called drop catching. where to find them discovery + filtering: → expireddomains[.]net → domcop → freshdrop → moonsy auctions + catching: → godaddy auctions → namecheap expired auctions → dynadot closeouts → namejet / snapnames → dropcatch (1,200+ registrars, best catch rate on contested names) the process: domain expires → grace period → “pending delete” → drops. once it’s pending delete (usually ~5 days before the drop) you can place a backorder. if more than one person wants it, it goes to auction. most of these never get listed for sale. catch the ones with real value (traffic, backlinks, brandable names).

• 
  Mikhail Rogov (@i_mika_el) reported 37 minutes ago

  @arvidkahl @Namecheap very strange. did Namecheap support confirm there is no manual transfer path either?

• 
  NameBio (@NameBio) reported 46 minutes ago

  Sales With History 📈 8Slot․com sold for $7,001 at GoDaddy - up from $12 in July 2020 at GoDaddy. 📈 Portet․com sold for $6,000 at Spaceship․com - up from $129 in November 2015 at NameJet. 📈 Tog․co․uk sold for $3,500 at Afternic - up from $600 in February 2011 at Sedo. 📉 OneProd․com sold for $504 at GoDaddy - down from $5,000 in December 2015 at Uniregistry. 📉 VanityBag․com sold for $435 at Namecheap - down from $5,000 in February 2011 at Sedo. Yesterday's Word Cloud + TLD Breakdown 👇

• 
  Brute Force Artist (@bruteforceart21) reported 48 minutes ago

  Claude = coding. ($20/mo) - Supabase = backend. (Free) - Vercel = deploying. (Free) - Namecheap = domain. ($12/yr) - Stripe = payments. (2.9%/transaction) - GitHub = version control. (Free) - Resend = emails. (Free) - Clerk = auth. (Free) - Cloudflare = DNS. (Free) - PostHog = analytics. (Free) - Sentry = error tracking. (Free) - Upstash = Redis. (Free) - Pinecone = vector DB. (Free) Total monthly cost to run a startup: ~$20 There has never been a cheaper time to build.

• 
  Dawid Makowski (@makowskid) reported 49 minutes ago

  @neerajjj6785 namecheap, cloudflare, never godaddy

• 
  SpamAuditor (@SpamAuditor) reported 50 minutes ago

  Watch for emails pretending to be support at @Namecheap, thankfully NameCheap has good SPF records in place, fake storage is full emails. If you get one of these, tell your email administrator to tighten up their SPF checks.@DatalixDE IP address 45.11.229.]113 this time

• 
  Lg Shurley (@SurelyLg) reported 50 minutes ago

  Be careful with @Namecheap. They have poor customer service and extremely strict refund policies. Even when they make an error, they’ll fight you on giving a refund and try to lowball you with a tiny credit. Just a heads up. #namecheap

• 
  Domayn Kapital (@domaynkapital) reported 54 minutes ago

  @Namecheap every other week there's a domain I win domains with non-functioning namerservers. 3-4 times in last months. I contact support and they tell gaslight me telling me it's all fine. Waste 30 minutes until they call a specialist to fixt it. Please deal with this.

• 
  GeniusHawlah 👨‍💻 (@GeniusHawlah) reported 56 minutes ago

  Namecheap are having legal issues, they can't sell out TLDs again. 😐

• 
  The Smart Ape 🔥 (@the_smart_ape) reported 56 minutes ago

  millions of companies forget to renew their domain names every year. you can just buy the expired domain someone forgot about and get a premium on it. it’s called drop catching. where to find them discovery + filtering: → expireddomains[.]net → domcop → freshdrop → moonsy auctions + catching: → godaddy auctions → namecheap expired auctions → dynadot closeouts → namejet / snapnames → dropcatch (1,200+ registrars, best catch rate on contested names) the process: domain expires → grace period → “pending delete” → drops. once it’s pending delete (usually ~5 days before the drop) you can place a backorder. if more than one person wants it, it goes to auction. most of these never get listed for sale. catch the ones with real value (traffic, backlinks, brandable names).

• 
  Vivek Teegalapally (@vivekteega) reported 58 minutes ago

  @prbhtkumr @Namecheap @snigdhasur Went through the Snigdha Sur case, it looks like there is some legality issue with their domain being used in India. Will read more to understand before making any judgement. Ps - I use namecheap for my website domain and it has worked great for me.