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Namecheap

Namecheap status: hosting issues and outage reports

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Full Outage Map

Namecheap provides services on domain name registration, and offer for sale domain names that are registered to third parties (also known as aftermarket domain names). It is also a web hosting company.

Problems in the last 24 hours

The graph below depicts the number of Namecheap reports received over the last 24 hours by time of day. When the number of reports exceeds the baseline, represented by the red line, an outage is determined.

At the moment, we haven't detected any problems at Namecheap. Are you experiencing issues or an outage? Leave a message in the comments section!

Most Reported Problems

The following are the most recent problems reported by Namecheap users through our website.

  • 57% Hosting (57%)
  • 43% Domains (43%)

Live Outage Map

The most recent Namecheap outage reports came from the following cities:

CityProblem TypeReport Time
Tuxtla Domains 20 days ago
Centerville Hosting 20 days ago
Noida Domains 1 month ago
Purmerend Domains 1 month ago
Istanbul Hosting 1 month ago
Charleston Hosting 1 month ago
Full Outage Map

Community Discussion

Tips? Frustrations? Share them here. Useful comments include a description of the problem, city and postal code.

Beware of "support numbers" or "recovery" accounts that might be posted below. Make sure to report and downvote those comments. Avoid posting your personal information.

Namecheap Issues Reports

Latest outage, problems and issue reports in social media:

  • mrhobbeys
    Spencer Heckathorn (@mrhobbeys) reported

    @BacLeodiv Everyone hates on Godaddy but I e been there 20 years and only had one major issue related to their migration in the early 2010s. Hundreds of domains and 40ish customers. No complaints. I also use the others. Namecheap is up and down on their support. Cloudflare I thought of as expensive. But honestly they all are now.

  • ImagineThisSM
    Imagine-This (@ImagineThisSM) reported

    @Namecheap hi, all my sites and applications are down, whats going on. please update us right away

  • the_smart_ape
    The Smart Ape ๐Ÿ”ฅ (@the_smart_ape) reported

    millions of companies forget to renew their domain names every year. you can just buy the expired domain someone forgot about and get a premium on it. itโ€™s called drop catching. where to find them discovery + filtering: โ†’ expireddomains[.]net โ†’ domcop โ†’ freshdrop โ†’ moonsy auctions + catching: โ†’ godaddy auctions โ†’ namecheap expired auctions โ†’ dynadot closeouts โ†’ namejet / snapnames โ†’ dropcatch (1,200+ registrars, best catch rate on contested names) the process: domain expires โ†’ grace period โ†’ โ€œpending deleteโ€ โ†’ drops. once itโ€™s pending delete (usually ~5 days before the drop) you can place a backorder. if more than one person wants it, it goes to auction. most of these never get listed for sale. catch the ones with real value (traffic, backlinks, brandable names).

  • nicolasexcc
    nicolasexc (@nicolasexcc) reported

    I'm a Global Admin locked out of my M365 tenant due to MFA with no recovery methods. Error 500121. I own the domain (registered in Namecheap) and can verify via DNS. Need urgent help resetting MFA. @MicrosoftHelps

  • mynamehack
    DomainHero (@mynamehack) reported

    @dynatodd @Namecheap @namecheapceo123 but don't know still they abuse to customer or investors community after VC takeover..

  • baro0xx
    Bennico (@baro0xx) reported

    @Namecheap Fix your servers!!! 33% packet lost to 8.8.8.8 is unacceptable even for a server in Africa. Your tech support telling me to reboot and change hostname. They clueless. This is a serious production software. Fix your servers and educate your tech support!!!

  • astralbodies
    Aaron Douglas (@astralbodies) reported

    Waking up to @Namecheap being down is not how I wanted to finish off my weekend. I've never seen an outage like this before with them!

  • Gh0styTongue
    GhostyTongue ใƒ„ (@Gh0styTongue) reported

    If @Namecheap had a **** I would be sucking it rn because how good their service is.

  • nitishxk
    Nitish (@nitishxk) reported

    today i learned how to make a website landing page using @claudeai added all my affiliate links in it namecheap domain for 11CAD uploaded index.html hosted on netlify added custom DNS verified SSL made 2 changes already site is mobile responsive **** beacons page

  • BaberRizvi
    Baber Rizvi (@BaberRizvi) reported

    @Namecheap @NamecheapCEO It's been almost a week now since my business websites are down because my namecheap server is down and support team can't even turn on the server so my team can connect to bring my sites back up. Who will be responsible for my business losses. I hope someone from namecheap will show some courage and at least turn on the server which I am paying for. Also there is no phone number to call and speak to someone so only way to communicate is either email or chat. Such a horrible service they don't care what it means to a business which heavily rely on website and it's been down for this long.

  • gatewaytodomain
    GatewayToDomains (@gatewaytodomain) reported

    @katerleonid No, I use Namecheap, Porkbun, Unstoppable, Regery, Netim, 101Domains based on the support for tld I want to register.

  • 0xTommyThomas
    Tommy Thomas (@0xTommyThomas) reported

    @adahstwt Iโ€™ve been using Namecheap for a while now, generally good integrations with other apps which make it easy to use. Pork bun is pretty decent too Will never understand why godaddy is called godaddy lol Squarespace in my experience is the most annoying to deal with for domain management tbh

  • HeyRajiya
    Rajiya Sultana (@HeyRajiya) reported

    @ZimalDesigner_ godaddy and namecheap mostly, never had issues with either ๐Ÿ‘

  • irucsbo
    ... (@irucsbo) reported

    .@Namecheap stole my funds and refuses to provide a real solution or proper support. Extremely disappointing experience with a company I trusted for years. Criminal organization. Avoid at all costs.

  • cstcksa
    ู…ุฑูƒุฒ ู…ู‡ุงุฑุงุช ุงู„ุฅุจุฏุงุน ู„ู„ุชุฏุฑูŠุจ (@cstcksa) reported

    @Namecheap Unfortunately, we have had an extremely poor experience with the current hosting provider. Despite multiple attempts to communicate through email and official support channels, we have received no response regarding our inquiries, technical support requests, or account management matters. The complete lack of communication and customer support has caused significant operational difficulties and has negatively affected the management of our website and educational platform. This level of service raises serious concerns about the provider's reliability, professionalism, and commitment to its contractual obligations. We respectfully request an immediate response to our pending requests and a prompt resolution of all outstanding issues. If the company is unable or unwilling to provide the required support, we request full cooperation in transferring the hosting account and related services to an alternative provider without further delay.

  • ArsiHoxha_
    Arsi Hoxha (@ArsiHoxha_) reported

    @adahstwt Namecheap for years then switched to Cloudflare and never looked back. no markup, no upsells, no drama ๐Ÿซถ

  • TheDevonWayne
    Devon Wayne (@TheDevonWayne) reported

    @PratikSinhatwt namecheap never godaddy ever again

  • synozeer
    Adam Maysonet (@synozeer) reported

    @TopShelfNames @spaceship If someone typed in the domain in their browser bar, they would have seen an Afternic lander. The person instead searched for the domain on Namecheap/Spaceship and bought it that way (aka. reg path), so they may never have even seen the lander.

  • sjlazars
    Sanjay Lazar (@sjlazars) reported

    @baxiabhishek @Namecheap Name cheap is just that ! Cheap !! Iโ€™ve had a similar experience a year ago, and I never went back to them. Buy domains elsewhere and pay a wee bit more for peace of mind

  • dkare1009
    Dhairya (@dkare1009) reported

    ๐Ÿ“‚ SaaS Stack โ”ƒ โ”ฃ ๐Ÿ“‚ Frontend โ”ƒ โ”ฃ ๐Ÿ“‚ React โ”ƒ โ”ฃ ๐Ÿ“‚ NextJS โ”ƒ โ”ฃ ๐Ÿ“‚ Vue โ”ƒ โ”ฃ ๐Ÿ“‚ TailwindCSS โ”ƒ โ”— ๐Ÿ“‚ Shadcn UI โ”ƒ โ”ฃ ๐Ÿ“‚ Backend โ”ƒ โ”ฃ ๐Ÿ“‚ NodeJS โ”ƒ โ”ฃ ๐Ÿ“‚ Django โ”ƒ โ”ฃ ๐Ÿ“‚ Laravel โ”ƒ โ”ฃ ๐Ÿ“‚ FastAPI โ”ƒ โ”— ๐Ÿ“‚ Express โ”ƒ โ”ฃ ๐Ÿ“‚ Database โ”ƒ โ”ฃ ๐Ÿ“‚ PostgreSQL โ”ƒ โ”ฃ ๐Ÿ“‚ MySQL โ”ƒ โ”ฃ ๐Ÿ“‚ MongoDB โ”ƒ โ”ฃ ๐Ÿ“‚ Redis โ”ƒ โ”— ๐Ÿ“‚ Supabase โ”ƒ โ”ฃ ๐Ÿ“‚ Auth โ”ƒ โ”ฃ ๐Ÿ“‚ Clerk โ”ƒ โ”ฃ ๐Ÿ“‚ Auth0 โ”ƒ โ”ฃ ๐Ÿ“‚ Firebase Auth โ”ƒ โ”ฃ ๐Ÿ“‚ Supabase Auth โ”ƒ โ”— ๐Ÿ“‚ NextAuth โ”ƒ โ”ฃ ๐Ÿ“‚ Payments โ”ƒ โ”ฃ ๐Ÿ“‚ Stripe โ”ƒ โ”ฃ ๐Ÿ“‚ Paddle โ”ƒ โ”ฃ ๐Ÿ“‚ Dodo Payments โ”ƒ โ”ฃ ๐Ÿ“‚ Lemon Squeezy โ”ƒ โ”— ๐Ÿ“‚ Polar โ”ƒ โ”ฃ ๐Ÿ“‚ Emails โ”ƒ โ”ฃ ๐Ÿ“‚ Resend โ”ƒ โ”ฃ ๐Ÿ“‚ SendGrid โ”ƒ โ”ฃ ๐Ÿ“‚ Mailgun โ”ƒ โ”ฃ ๐Ÿ“‚ Postmark โ”ƒ โ”— ๐Ÿ“‚ Amazon SES โ”ƒ โ”ฃ ๐Ÿ“‚ Storage โ”ƒ โ”ฃ ๐Ÿ“‚ AWS โ”ƒ โ”ฃ ๐Ÿ“‚ Cloudflare โ”ƒ โ”ฃ ๐Ÿ“‚ Google Cloud Storage โ”ƒ โ”ฃ ๐Ÿ“‚ Supabase Storage โ”ƒ โ”— ๐Ÿ“‚ Uploadcare โ”ƒ โ”ฃ ๐Ÿ“‚ Deployment โ”ƒ โ”ฃ ๐Ÿ“‚ Vercel โ”ƒ โ”ฃ ๐Ÿ“‚ Netlify โ”ƒ โ”ฃ ๐Ÿ“‚ Railway โ”ƒ โ”ฃ ๐Ÿ“‚ Render โ”ƒ โ”— ๐Ÿ“‚ AWS โ”ƒ โ”ฃ ๐Ÿ“‚ Domains and DNS โ”ƒ โ”ฃ ๐Ÿ“‚ Namecheap โ”ƒ โ”ฃ ๐Ÿ“‚ Hostinger โ”ƒ โ”ฃ ๐Ÿ“‚ Cloudflare DNS โ”ƒ โ”ฃ ๐Ÿ“‚ Google Domains โ”ƒ โ”— ๐Ÿ“‚ SiteGround โ”ƒ โ”ฃ ๐Ÿ“‚ Analytics โ”ƒ โ”ฃ ๐Ÿ“‚ Google Analytics โ”ƒ โ”ฃ ๐Ÿ“‚ Plausible โ”ƒ โ”ฃ ๐Ÿ“‚ PostHog โ”ƒ โ”ฃ ๐Ÿ“‚ Mixpanel โ”ƒ โ”— ๐Ÿ“‚ DataFast โ”ƒ โ”ฃ ๐Ÿ“‚ Monitoring โ”ƒ โ”ฃ ๐Ÿ“‚ Sentry โ”ƒ โ”ฃ ๐Ÿ“‚ LogRocket โ”ƒ โ”ฃ ๐Ÿ“‚ Datadog โ”ƒ โ”ฃ ๐Ÿ“‚ NewRelic โ”ƒ โ”— ๐Ÿ“‚ UptimeRobot โ”ƒ โ”ฃ ๐Ÿ“‚ DevOps โ”ƒ โ”ฃ ๐Ÿ“‚ Docker โ”ƒ โ”ฃ ๐Ÿ“‚ Kubernetes โ”ƒ โ”ฃ ๐Ÿ“‚ GitHub Actions โ”ƒ โ”ฃ ๐Ÿ“‚ CI CD โ”ƒ โ”— ๐Ÿ“‚ Terraform โ”ƒ โ”ฃ ๐Ÿ“‚ Search โ”ƒ โ”ฃ ๐Ÿ“‚ Algolia โ”ƒ โ”ฃ ๐Ÿ“‚ Meilisearch โ”ƒ โ”ฃ ๐Ÿ“‚ Elasticsearch โ”ƒ โ”ฃ ๐Ÿ“‚ Typesense โ”ƒ โ”— ๐Ÿ“‚ OpenSearch โ”ƒ โ”ฃ ๐Ÿ“‚ AI Integration โ”ƒ โ”ฃ ๐Ÿ“‚ OpenAI API โ”ƒ โ”ฃ ๐Ÿ“‚ Anthropic API โ”ƒ โ”ฃ ๐Ÿ“‚ Replicate โ”ƒ โ”ฃ ๐Ÿ“‚ HuggingFace โ”ƒ โ”— ๐Ÿ“‚ Gemini API โ”ƒ โ”ฃ ๐Ÿ“‚ Integrations โ”ƒ โ”ฃ ๐Ÿ“‚ Zapier โ”ƒ โ”ฃ ๐Ÿ“‚ Make โ”ƒ โ”ฃ ๐Ÿ“‚ n8n โ”ƒ โ”ฃ ๐Ÿ“‚ Pabbly โ”ƒ โ”— ๐Ÿ“‚ Webhooks โ”ƒ โ”ฃ ๐Ÿ“‚ Security โ”ƒ โ”ฃ ๐Ÿ“‚ SSL โ”ƒ โ”ฃ ๐Ÿ“‚ Cloudflare โ”ƒ โ”ฃ ๐Ÿ“‚ WAF โ”ƒ โ”ฃ ๐Ÿ“‚ Rate Limiting โ”ƒ โ”— ๐Ÿ“‚ Secrets Management โ”ƒ โ”ฃ ๐Ÿ“‚ Marketing โ”ƒ โ”ฃ ๐Ÿ“‚ Search Console โ”ƒ โ”ฃ ๐Ÿ“‚ Outrank โ”ƒ โ”ฃ ๐Ÿ“‚ Buffer โ”ƒ โ”ฃ ๐Ÿ“‚ Analytics โ”ƒ โ”— ๐Ÿ“‚ Kit โ”ƒ โ”— ๐Ÿ“‚ Customer Support โ”ฃ ๐Ÿ“‚ Intercom โ”ฃ ๐Ÿ“‚ Crisp โ”ฃ ๐Ÿ“‚ Zendesk โ”ฃ ๐Ÿ“‚ Tawk โ”— ๐Ÿ“‚ HelpScout

  • FriendOfTheInst
    ๐Ÿ›ก๏ธShir Khorshid Noor Cyber Unit๐Ÿ›ก๏ธ (@FriendOfTheInst) reported

    Sponsored search results are not a trust boundary. A fake ChatGPT download campaign used brand impersonation, malvertising, shared-link abuse, cloaking, platform-specific payloads, CAPTCHA gating, Electron packaging, JavaScript obfuscation, and staged execution to deliver malware to Windows and macOS users. This is not merely another fake download page. It is a clear demonstration of how attackers exploit trust across multiple layers: โ€ข Trusted brand โ€ข Trusted search flow โ€ข Trusted-looking ad placement โ€ข Trusted-looking domain patterns โ€ข Trusted UI/branding โ€ข Trusted installer frameworks โ€ข Trusted code-signing assumptions โ€ข Trusted AI platform sharing features What happened: Attackers promoted a fake OpenAI/ChatGPT download experience using the domain: openew[.]app The site copied OpenAI-style branding and offered download paths for: โ€ข Windows โ€ข macOS โ€ข Chrome extension The Chrome extension path linked to a legitimate ChatGPT-related extension, further increasing perceived legitimacy. The Windows and macOS download paths delivered malware. Attackers also abused legitimate ChatGPT shared conversation links, including chatgpt[.]com/s/ pages, to host fake outage or download pages. A link hosted on a trusted domain can still deliver attacker-controlled content to users. The campaign employed cloaking and conditional rendering: automated scanners and analysis tools were shown benign content, reportedly an unrelated AR/VR company site, while real browsers received the malicious ChatGPT-themed download experience. That is the key lesson: A trusted domain, HTTPS padlock, sponsored ad, or polished UI does not equal a safe download. Why this campaign matters: Victims were not browsing dark web forums or downloading cracks. They were searching for a legitimate AI tool. That is why malvertising is effective: it targets high-intent users at the exact moment they are ready to install software. The campaign turned normal user behavior into an initial access path. Windows chain: The Windows payload was distributed as: Chat_GPT.exe Reported SHA-256: 56CC26E88C064B0C423AA8AD6530E58F91D1E4D28FAB1A8BCEDEF16A6582B4D2 Additional reported Windows hash: c9e0e6985dca3a179c9bdea4e7b38f7dc57fe00ecedc2fd634256fc53bf2de2d Important: hashes are useful for triage, not sufficient for defense. Campaigns rotate samples. Hunt behaviorally. Windows technical observations: โ€ข Installer built with Inno Setup โ€ข Electron-based application โ€ข Chromium runtime components โ€ข resources\app.asar archive โ€ข Large obfuscated JavaScript payload identified as winter.js โ€ข Hex-encoded strings โ€ข Dynamically resolved functions โ€ข Control-flow obfuscation โ€ข Event-driven execution โ€ข CAPTCHA gating before core behavior โ€ข Inner Electron payload (App.exe) launched after installation โ€ข PowerShell spawned after CAPTCHA completion Observed PowerShell pattern: -ExecutionPolicy Unrestricted -Command - That trailing dash matters. It suggests commands may be supplied through standard input rather than appearing directly in the process command line. This reduces the value of command-line-only detection and makes process-tree and behavioral monitoring much more important. Static red flags: The filename suggested ChatGPT, but embedded metadata reportedly identified the installer as: PovariEGLESVapp Setup The executable was signed by: F.F.A.P. Hurkmans Beheer B.V. That publisher does not align with OpenAI or ChatGPT. Important reminder: a valid code signature does not mean software is safe. It only confirms that the file was signed by a certificate and has not been modified since signing. It does not establish that the software is legitimate or authorized by the brand it imitates. Additional Windows indicators: โ€ข App.exe SHA-256: D9AD44D43E57B870793FA5CF7FB3A813990D0CBD0C7087BDE70A5E61FB1F1FE6 โ€ข Unexpected Chromium/Electron profile: %APPDATA%\Satoshi โ€ข Additional reported path: %APPDATA%\LeronApplication โ€ข Reported Electron/Node capabilities: systeminformation, child_process, os, fs, zip-lib, Those modules indicate a capable execution environment: system discovery, file access, archive handling, process execution, and network communication. macOS chain: The macOS payload was delivered as: ChatGpt.dmg Reported SHA-256: 7E5B708F6659B1FAD3AAE7B589A706434FBF21708AEEC5AF5910189B96E25FEF Additional reported macOS hash: c0919e1999eaee67e67aeda0287722775afb04e9a9a0f727928b4d11265fb70b The macOS malware is reported as Odyssey Stealer, a fork of AMOS / Atomic Stealer. Reported macOS targeting includes: โ€ข Browser passwords โ€ข Browser cookies โ€ข Saved logins โ€ข macOS keychain data โ€ข Telegram sessions โ€ข Cryptocurrency wallet directories โ€ข Desktop/Documents files with sensitive wallet/key extensions โ€ข Ledger Live โ€ข Trezor Suite โ€ข Exodus โ€ข Electrum โ€ข Sparrow The most dangerous macOS behavior: Wallet replacement. The malware reportedly attempts to replace legitimate wallet-related applications with trojanized versions. That means a victim may later open what appears to be their normal wallet app, but actually launch an attacker-controlled version. That is not only credential theft. That is long-tail financial compromise. Infrastructure: Reported malicious domain: openew[.]app Reported infrastructure includes: 144[.]172[.]104[.]205 188[.]137[.]246[.]189 192[.]253[.]248[.]181 172[.]94[.]9[.]250 Infrastructure notes: โ€ข Recently registered domain โ€ข Namecheap / registrar-servers infrastructure reported โ€ข RouterHosting infrastructure reported โ€ข Passive DNS linked infrastructure to other suspicious or malicious domains โ€ข .app domains require HTTPS, so browsers show a padlock The padlock only means the connection is encrypted. It does not mean the site is legitimate. Detection opportunities for defenders: 1. Newly created executables launched from Downloads, Temp, or other user-writable paths 2. Trusted-brand filenames that do not match embedded metadata 3. Installer publisher mismatch: filename says ChatGPT, signer is unrelated 4. Electron apps spawning scripting engines: powershell.exe cmd.exe osascript bash sh zsh 5. PowerShell with: -ExecutionPolicy Unrestricted -Command - 6. Unexpected Chromium/Electron profile directories, such as: %APPDATA%\Satoshi %APPDATA%\LeronApplication or other anomalous Electron profile paths 7. app.asar archives containing large obfuscated JavaScript bundles 8. CAPTCHA or user-interaction gating before malicious behavior 9. Newly registered domains impersonating major software or AI vendors 10. Users installing software from ads instead of official vendor channels 11. Suspicious wallet-app replacement attempts on macOS 12. Post-install network traffic to low-cost VPS infrastructure 13. Legitimate AI sharing URLs that render fake support, outage, update, or installation pages 14. Download pages that show different content to scanners than to real browsers The key defensive point: Do not build detections only around hashes or static strings. This campaign reduces the value of static analysis through: โ€ข Obfuscation โ€ข Runtime string construction โ€ข CAPTCHA gating โ€ข Electron packaging โ€ข Conditional execution โ€ข Cloaking โ€ข Staged payload behavior โ€ข Shared-link abuse on trusted domains The better approach: โ€ข Behavioral detection โ€ข Process-tree monitoring โ€ข Parent-child process analysis โ€ข Script-engine execution monitoring โ€ข Browser/download source telemetry โ€ข Application control โ€ข Newly registered domain monitoring โ€ข Publisher and metadata validation โ€ข EDR detections for Electron-to-shell execution โ€ข Monitoring for AI-platform shared links used as delivery pages โ€ข User training focused on sponsored-result and fake-download risk For users: Only download ChatGPT from official OpenAI channels or the Microsoft Store. Do not install software from ads, mirror sites, download portals, unfamiliar domains, or fake support/outage pages. If you installed a โ€œChatGPTโ€ app from an ad or unfamiliar page: Use a clean device and: โ€ข Sign out everywhere from important accounts โ€ข Change passwords, starting with primary email โ€ข Rotate API keys, SSH keys, cloud credentials, and tokens โ€ข Revoke active sessions for email, GitHub, cloud, Discord, Telegram, crypto exchanges, banking, and password managers โ€ข Move crypto funds from a clean device โ€ข Do not open Ledger/Trezor apps on a potentially infected Mac โ€ข Monitor financial accounts โ€ข Reinstall the OS โ€ข Notify IT/security immediately if it was a work device For AI vendors and platform owners: This is now part of the product security perimeter. Brand impersonation, malicious search ads, fake download pages, clone domains, and abuse of shared AI content are active distribution channels. Practical controls: โ€ข Make official download links easy to find โ€ข Monitor sponsored ads for brand abuse โ€ข Monitor newly registered lookalike domains โ€ข Detect abuse of shared-content features โ€ข Run takedowns quickly โ€ข Publish clear download guidance โ€ข Provide signed-installer verification guidance โ€ข Coordinate with search/ad platforms โ€ข Alert users when major impersonation campaigns are active Bottom line: Attackers are not just exploiting ChatGPT. They are exploiting the trust, urgency, and confusion around fast-moving AI adoption. Today it is ChatGPT. Yesterday it was another AI tool. Tomorrow it will be the next trending product. The malware can rotate. The domain can rotate. The payload can rotate. The brand can rotate. The infrastructure can rotate. The defensive mindset must rotate too: From: โ€œIs this file known bad?โ€ To: โ€œIs this behavior legitimate for this software, this publisher, this user, this source, and this execution context?โ€ That is the difference between signature-based reaction and modern detection engineering. Analysis draws on reporting from Malwarebytes Labs, Evalian SOC, Push Security, BleepingComputer, CybersecurityNews, and OpenAI documentation. #CyberSecurity #Malvertising #ThreatIntelligence

  • _whiletruedo
    rodrigo (@_whiletruedo) reported

    @Namecheap thx for the heads up! I'll reach out the support. but don't be alarmed bc you're my first choice to buy domain sice ever! and I'll continue to buy!

  • RealLight47
    Favour Light (@RealLight47) reported

    @Namecheap has probably the worst customer support I've ever had to deal with. I've been locked out of my account and haven't gotten a single reply to any of the emails I've sent.

  • nicolasexcc
    nicolasexc (@nicolasexcc) reported

    I'm a Global Admin locked out of my M365 tenant due to MFA with no recovery methods. Error 500121. I own the domain (registered in Namecheap) and can verify via DNS. Need urgent help resetting MFA. @MicrosoftHelps

  • LongevityWorldC
    Longevity World Cup (@LongevityWorldC) reported

    Longevity World Cup is temporarily unavailable due to a @Namecheap hosting network incident affecting hosted websites and accounts. Weโ€™re monitoring the situation and will be back online once connectivity is restored.

  • based64_eth
    based64 (@based64_eth) reported

    @faa0311 Whatever you do stay away from @Namecheap. Once they had an issue with SMS OTP and users were locked out for months with no recourse.

  • AdamHoltererer
    Adam Holter (@AdamHoltererer) reported

    @gauravsapkotanp Definitely not Namecheap, because @theo said they were bad and scammy.

  • GLAsk1d
    ๐Ÿ‡ฌโ€Œ๐Ÿ‡ฑโ€Œ๐Ÿ‡ฆโ€Œ๐Ÿ‡ธโ€Œ๐Ÿ‡ฐโ€Œ๐Ÿ‡ฎโ€Œ๐Ÿ‡ฉโ€Œ (@GLAsk1d) reported

    @TheTrunkTales @Namecheap Not at my PC rn so I can't check, but those all resolved to a login portal? ๐Ÿ˜ณ

  • dcwhatwhat
    Jamie Madden (@dcwhatwhat) reported

    I am down to 1 page of domains on my namecheap account, from 3 pages. AMA

  • kekkodamato_
    Kekko Dโ€™Amato (@kekkodamato_) reported

    @TTrimoreau Cloudflare Registrar if your TLD is supported โ€” at-cost pricing (literally no markup), best DNS control, DNSSEC built in, zero upsells. Namecheap otherwise. Free WhoisGuard, clean UI, rarely issues. GoDaddy is a trap โ€” they charge 3x and count on you not noticing at renewal.