NatWest status: access issues and outage reports

Problems in the last 24 hours in Aylesbury, England

The chart below shows the number of NatWest reports we have received in the last 24 hours from users in Aylesbury, England and surrounding areas. An outage is declared when the number of reports exceeds the baseline, represented by the red line.

Community Discussion

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NatWest Issues Reports

Latest outage, problems and issue reports in social media:

• 
  Lucy Dorrington (@TheParentGame) reported 4 minutes ago

  @santanderuk @TSB Why have you blocked access to online banking unless various ID demands and proof of earnings are met? You say it's the law, but I bank with Barclays and NatWest and haven't had to do this? I don't see how it's only necessary for you?

• 
  Rt Hon Prof Lord Andrew GCVO KHP FRCS FTSE MSCI (@PrivateIncome) reported 7 minutes ago

  @DustyBo80599309 @SophieP25397 £23bn from “9 years ago”? Mate, the bailouts were 2007-09. That’s not “9 years ago”. Your £23bn figure was a 2018 OBR snapshot, not a live invoice. We’ve fully exited every single intervention — final NatWest shares sold May 2025. No ring-fenced ‘bailout debt’ still sitting there waiting for your PAYE. Debt is aggregate. Interest is paid on the total stock. Treating it like a personal loan you’re still ‘funding’ is pure fantasy accounting. And spare us the ‘hitting the vulnerable while ignoring tax dodgers’ sermon. Legal tax avoidance isn’t theft, and the alternative to those bailouts was depositors queuing outside branches and the entire system melting down. You’d have been first in the queue complaining about that too. Next.

• 
  🇬🇧🔥 FIRE is awesome 😎 (@GrahamCompton) reported 7 minutes ago

  @cryptostride Natwest. Their deals are awful at the moment.

• 
  Web3Alert (@theweb3alert) reported 8 minutes ago

  Most people know Gilbert Verdian as "the Quant CEO" Founder, CEO, the face of $QNT Fewer people actually know what he was doing before Quant existed. 20+ years in cybersecurity across 3+ governments before he ever touched crypto • Downing St • HM Treasury • Bank of England • Ministry of Justice • US Federal Reserve • NSW Health in Aus And of course there's everything on the private sector side with Vocalink and standards with ISO. That's NOT a typical crypto founder resume. That's someone who spent 2 decades inside the exact institutions Quant's now offering interoperability infrastructure to. And the idea for Overledger didn't come from a whitepaper brainstorm either... It came directly out of his work on ISO TC307, the international blockchain standards committee, back in 2016. He kept running into the same problem across every government and bank he worked with None of these systems could talk to each other. Quant was built to solve that specific problem Fast forward to today and that same TC307 work is still active Quant remains one of the core voices shaping ISO standards across 53 countries. The UK picked Quant to build the infrastructure for GBTD, tokenised sterling deposits, with Barclays, HSBC, Lloyds, NatWest, Nationwide and Santander all on board. Overledger sits inside Project Rosalind with the Bank of England and BIS. Inside the ECB's work. Inside the UK's Regulated Liability Network. Inside of UK Finance's GBTD which has received approval by the likes of UK Chancellor & Bank of England. None of that happens by accident. It happens because the guy building it spent two decades inside the rooms where these decisions actually get made.

• 
  Lorraine Morris (@MLorrM) reported 10 minutes ago

  In the case of Perks v NatWest Markets Plc (evidence given around 2022), Mr Neil Graham — a GRG director, chartered accountant and experienced banker — was cross-examined under oath about the bank’s RMP credit system entries for swap-related credit lines / contingent obligations (often referred to as CLU – Credit Line Utilisation). Key exchanges reported in the materials include: 🔹Mr Graham accepted that the credit-line entry on the RMP system represented the client’s contingent obligation. 🔹Mr Graham agreed it was a factor the bank used when considering in loan-to-value calculations for the overall connection. 🔹When asked whether it could push a connection over a loan-to-value ratio covenant, he answered (subject to market movements) yes. 🔹He further accepted that this could ultimately lead to the connection being transferred into GRG. 🔹Mr Graham is experienced and the testimony is truthful; however, as happened in Ireland - bank’s counsel later attempted to “distance the bank from this evidence in closing submissions”. 🔹Surprise, surprise but bank’s counsel is categorically misleading the Court. 🔹They characterised Graham’s answers as given “on the hoof,” - said it was not his specialist area and submitted that he was wrong on the LTV impact point. 🔹They argued the bank did not accept that the CLU had the effect claimed and that there was no duty to volunteer information about it to the customer. 🔹This was what bank counsel is required to do to keep the charade going and that they cavalierly do so is a scandal in itself. 🔹Mr Graham’s testimony exists and is on the public record, as circulated by campaigners and referenced in related presentations. 🔹So, a senior bank director & chartered accountant with a GRG/risk-adjacent role did accept under oath that the credit line could cause or contribute to an LTV breach and subsequent transfer into GRG. 🔹This is rather obvious and is in fact why the products were sold in the first instance - as confirmed by numerous insiders. 🔹NatWest’s formal position in that case (and more generally) has been to treat such lines as “internal risk measures” rather than customer-facing hard liabilities that automatically breach covenants in the way alleged, and to reject the broader fraud characterisation. But that would be their formal position would it not? When billions of euros is at stake? 🔹Meanwhile customers faced enormous break costs & this fact alone is wholly inconsistent with the characterisation of the credit line as a purely internal risk measure. 🔹It is however consistent with the reality, which is that the bank had booked (and later crystallised) an exposure against their customers and the credit line had been concealed. 🔹That bank counsel filed pleadings that falsely characterised these structures as just fixing an interest rate or just ordinary fixed-rate loans, facilitating the burying of the misrepresentations under layers of legal process - is a further scandal - akin to that whereby the lawyers who managed to lock up innocent sub-postmasters on foot of unsound evidence. 🔹The result for Irish SMEs duped by theses practices was a systematic extraction of value from those SMEs - while the guilty institution and its lawyers ensured that accountability remained permanently out of reach. @ArturNadol7566 @Wftproof

• 
  jeremyhead (@jeremyhead) reported 12 minutes ago

  I did exactly that with NatWest and got an apology and compensation. (Think it was £100) Clearly an issue with training that needs highlighting.

• 
  Atil00503 (@atil00503) reported 14 minutes ago

  Elon Musk, shall I tell you what else those NatWest employees—who scammed me out of 300 pounds—did? They kept blocking my contactless payments; and they send me a message asking me to reply "yes" if I try to make the payment or "no" if I didn't. I reply "yes," confirming I try to make the payment, and they send a follow-up message saying I could use my card—yet my card remained blocked. I called NatWest customer service and explained the situation to the representative: I replied "yes" to the message and was told I could use my card again, but I still couldn't use it because it was blocked. The representative was surprised, said they didn't know why this had happened, and reactivated my card. Elon Musk, they kept blocking my contactless payments—and let me put this in a way you'd understand: they didn't do it for security reasons. In fact, I hadn't made a single payment with that card yet; I tried to make a contactless payment somewhere but couldn't because they had blocked it. The shop assistant even told me, "They probably blocked it because you made too many contactless payments today"—even though I hadn't used the card anywhere before that.

• 
  WGCitizens (@WGCitizens) reported 15 minutes ago

  My reward for years of customer loyalty to NatWest bank? Their pockets stuffed with profit and the high street branches closed, including WGC. Customer service? Nah, just shareholder fixation…and a failure to support those who’ve supported their company.

• 
  Connie (@ConnieSherge) reported 16 minutes ago

  @12beattiestp @PedeJo__ @isabelrosesss this is correct. the bank is natwest (rbs) nobody has access to anything and everything is scrambled outside of production. i dont think theres even a fat unix wizard who has access to read production, from what i remember working there

• 
  Mohammed Azhar (@mdazhar1989) reported 16 minutes ago

  @suzuki2wheelers Hi, Our Access 125 had been given for service to Natwest Suzuki on Jun 4, and vehicle hasn't been returned back yet. The head of service is giving invalid reasons and keeps on delaying. Request to take immediate steps