NatWest status: access issues and outage reports

Problems in the last 24 hours in Heanor, England

The chart below shows the number of NatWest reports we have received in the last 24 hours from users in Heanor, England and surrounding areas. An outage is declared when the number of reports exceeds the baseline, represented by the red line.

Community Discussion

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NatWest Issues Reports Near Heanor, England

Latest outage, problems and issue reports in Heanor and nearby locations:

• 
  Wolves Gang (@wolvesgang20) reported 2 minutes ago from Hucknall under Huthwaite, England

  I'm not in mood today because my ******* internet not working in my area and I tried to order iPhone 12 pro max and my card not working so I need to switch to NatWest from Lloyds and I really wants to move to London by end of the year because so many memories

• 
  David (@discodazeo) reported 30 minutes ago from Beeston, England

  @cathaypacific Been trying for 5 days to pay #cathaypacific with NatWest #mastercard for flights to Australia. A friend has also tried for me with a Tesco MasterCard. Not accepting payment. Clearly an issue with cp. Please help! I want to pay you £3600!!!

• 
  Elizabeth (@MOLLYBRUSH1903) reported 56 minutes ago from West Bridgford, England

  @GeorgeMonbiot Not Vodafone but had a bad experience during the whole Power of Attorney procedure. I felt that nobody really cared and it was very low priority. Have had apology and compensation from NatWest and Phoenix Life but there will be many who just put up with this shoddy service

NatWest Issues Reports

Latest outage, problems and issue reports in social media:

• 
  X Finance Bull (@Xfinancebull) reported 3 minutes ago

  🚨 $QNT holders, seven major UK banks are testing programmable bank money on infrastructure provided by Quant. Read those names again: Barclays. HSBC. Lloyds Banking Group. NatWest. Santander. Monzo. Nationwide. Led by UK Finance, the Great British Tokenised Deposit initiative is delivering live pilot transactions involving digital versions of normal sterling bank deposits. The easiest way to understand it is this: Your money remains bank money. But instead of sending it blindly and trusting every person in the process, rules can be attached before it moves. Payment releases when the buyer receives the product. Mortgage funds transfer when every document and condition is ready. Money and a tokenised asset settle together, so neither participant is left waiting and exposed. Quant’s Overledger provides the orchestration and interoperability connecting participating banks with RTGS, Faster Payments, Open Banking and tokenised-deposit platforms. That is why this matters more than another blockchain demonstration. The institutions are testing real financial activity across multiple banks, with fraud protection, settlement efficiency and programmability at the centre. GBTD also follows Quant’s involvement in the UK Regulated Liability Network, while its acceptance into the Bank of England Synchronisation Lab places the project beside the UK’s work on atomic central-bank-money settlement. Does this guarantee every bank will buy QNT? No. But it gives Quant institutional validation that most interoperability projects spend years trying to earn. If GBTD succeeds, the opportunity will extend far beyond one UK pilot. Other countries are also exploring tokenised deposits, digital securities and connected payment systems. QNT is sitting behind infrastructure the largest banks will need to make those separate systems work together. Many people will study QNT after adoption becomes obvious. I would rather understand why seven banks selected Quant before everyone else notices. My conviction in $QNT came before the headlines. Now the adoption is becoming impossible to ignore.

• 
  lostinfens (@lostinfens1) reported 5 minutes ago

  @smashingdildos One of the reasons I'm shutting down my Natwest accounts.

• 
  cj (@cjhmode) reported 5 minutes ago

  @AlvinMutyaba @augusteprompt Every bank lets you on and off ramp but for on ramp it’s limited as I say above. Some banks may be friendlier than others and allow slightly higher limits or open a discussion with you based on your personal circumstances (for example, Barclays will, NatWest won’t). I was able to off ramp with no limits and use the proceeds to buy my house, after strict due diligence around source of funds of course. Hence I no longer own or trade any crypto in this difficult market and with this unfriendly regime personally. Regarding leverage trading, I’m not sure. I imagine you could use Hyperliquid with a VPN, not sure if that will become impossible when the new restrictions land. Personally I’ve never traded leverage, that’s too much of a casino for me. I only ever traded spot. And obviously there’s lots of avenues for that. Hence I think it’s an exaggeration to say it’s dead here, but it will certainly become hard to justify once CGT is upped (circling back to my original point).

• 
  Tariff Turnip (@MetaverseGamma) reported 6 minutes ago

  @mrsDugskullery @p0Intyhead @LBC What exactly is that you think happens when a bank collapses? It’s certainly not just the shareholders that lose out, if Brown had let Natwest collapse they would have had to insure £2 trillion of customer deposits, something tells me that might have cost more than a bailout.

• 
  Lorraine Morris (@MLorrM) reported 6 minutes ago

  In the case of Perks v NatWest Markets Plc (evidence given around 2022), Mr Neil Graham — a GRG director, chartered accountant and experienced banker — was cross-examined under oath about the bank’s RMP credit system entries for swap-related credit lines / contingent obligations (often referred to as CLU – Credit Line Utilisation). Key exchanges reported in the materials include: 🔹Mr Graham accepted that the credit-line entry on the RMP system represented the client’s contingent obligation. 🔹Mr Graham agreed it was a factor the bank used when considering in loan-to-value calculations for the overall connection. 🔹When asked whether it could push a connection over a loan-to-value ratio covenant, he answered (subject to market movements) yes. 🔹He further accepted that this could ultimately lead to the connection being transferred into GRG. 🔹Mr Graham is experienced and the testimony is truthful; however, as happened in Ireland - bank’s counsel later attempted to “distance the bank from this evidence in closing submissions”. 🔹Surprise, surprise but bank’s counsel is categorically misleading the Court. 🔹They characterised Graham’s answers as given “on the hoof,” - said it was not his specialist area and submitted that he was wrong on the LTV impact point. 🔹They argued the bank did not accept that the CLU had the effect claimed and that there was no duty to volunteer information about it to the customer. 🔹This was what bank counsel is required to do to keep the charade going and that they cavalierly do so is a scandal in itself. 🔹Mr Graham’s testimony exists and is on the public record, as circulated by campaigners and referenced in related presentations. 🔹So, a senior bank director & chartered accountant with a GRG/risk-adjacent role did accept under oath that the credit line could cause or contribute to an LTV breach and subsequent transfer into GRG. 🔹This is rather obvious and is in fact why the products were sold in the first instance - as confirmed by numerous insiders. 🔹NatWest’s formal position in that case (and more generally) has been to treat such lines as “internal risk measures” rather than customer-facing hard liabilities that automatically breach covenants in the way alleged, and to reject the broader fraud characterisation. But that would be their formal position would it not? When billions of euros is at stake? 🔹Meanwhile customers faced enormous break costs & this fact alone is wholly inconsistent with the characterisation of the credit line as a purely internal risk measure. 🔹It is however consistent with the reality, which is that the bank had booked (and later crystallised) an exposure against their customers and the credit line had been concealed. 🔹That bank counsel filed pleadings that falsely characterised these structures as just fixing an interest rate or just ordinary fixed-rate loans, facilitating the burying of the misrepresentations under layers of legal process - is a further scandal - akin to that whereby the lawyers who managed to lock up innocent sub-postmasters on foot of unsound evidence. 🔹The result for Irish SMEs duped by theses practices was a systematic extraction of value from those SMEs - while the guilty institution and its lawyers ensured that accountability remained permanently out of reach. @ArturNadol7566 @Wftproof

• 
  jeremyhead (@jeremyhead) reported 8 minutes ago

  I did exactly that with NatWest and got an apology and compensation. (Think it was £100) Clearly an issue with training that needs highlighting.

• 
  lauren ୨୧ (@michellesdowden) reported 8 minutes ago

  natwest resolved my problem in my favour hahahahahaha shame @ booking . com

• 
  Mike64 (@walshie64) reported 10 minutes ago

  @TheGamesDeadM8 shocking how they've let that area down ,and all them skagheads go in the local natwest cos they've all got accounts in there ,one even had a piss in the mortgage interview room 😳

• 
  Alison (@norallie) reported 14 minutes ago

  @Nora11447402 @bmstewart2004 I hope it ends up a quick and painless experience. My bank was NatWest btw. Very good service from them and they understood my issue straight away. They even backdated it to my cancellation date when the first unauthorized debit resulted in my receiving the product.

• 
  Sumanyu Sharma 🍫 (@sumanyu) reported 15 minutes ago

  @ElevenLabs @LDNTechWeek @CosineAI launches Lumen Sovereign, Britain's first sovereign frontier model. Co-designed with BT, Lloyds, NatWest, LSEG, PwC, BAE Systems, Leonardo UK, Babcock, Thales UK, and Telefónica Tech UK&I. Runs entirely inside customer infrastructure with no external data transfer.