NatWest status: access issues and outage reports

Problems in the last 24 hours in Farnham, England

The chart below shows the number of NatWest reports we have received in the last 24 hours from users in Farnham, England and surrounding areas. An outage is declared when the number of reports exceeds the baseline, represented by the red line.

Community Discussion

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NatWest Issues Reports Near Farnham, England

Latest outage, problems and issue reports in Farnham and nearby locations:

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  Helsbels 🏴󠁧󠁢󠁳󠁣󠁴󠁿 🇬🇧 🇺🇦 (@hihings) reported 40 minutes ago from Bordon, England

  when I was with NatWest I could always get onto their app. With @HalifaxBank I can't. Too many branches closed and I need to access my account

• 
  Lee @ 155 Farnham (@LordDroverson) reported 56 minutes ago from Farnham, England

  @cjhunter1966 Natwest Farnham is now closing for good on October 4th. Terrible news. based i would think on financial decisions rather than taking care of customers. @NatWestGroup #farnham

NatWest Issues Reports

Latest outage, problems and issue reports in social media:

• 
  Paul Ashley (@PaulMAshley) reported 5 minutes ago

  @EllardKing My 1.45% 5yr fix ends 31.08.26. NatWest new offer received last Friday, is 5.02%. ‘Only’ £250 more per month so lucky compared to some, but that’s £3K per year, less I can save/invest. I agree that the 4/5% mark is closer to what I should expect so time to get used to it.

• 
  Paul Lewis (@paullewismoney) reported 8 minutes ago

  @Helixd @OborneTweets It was entirely different. Coutts didn’t debank him. It told him he was no longer welcome as a customer and offered him an ordinary NatWest account - it owns Coutts. It was F who turned it into a victimisation story.

• 
  Callum (@rapiddescentsco) reported 9 minutes ago

  @isabelrosesss This is the NatWest/old RBS digital banking login. It is designed to use multiple authentication methods but they've just stuck with partial date of birth id/partial passcode for the last 18 years or so! It could use the EMV card reader, but that'd just confuse customers.

• 
  IrrationalSloth (@IrrationalSloth) reported 9 minutes ago

  @DaveCrypto101 @pokemondealsuk Natwest provide virtual cards and i had no issues, though ive not used their virtual cards

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  lostinfens (@lostinfens1) reported 10 minutes ago

  @smashingdildos One of the reasons I'm shutting down my Natwest accounts.

• 
  Tania Falk (@FalkTania) reported 12 minutes ago

  @support_desk79 @NatWest_Help is this an official NatWest support account?

• 
  Charlotte Coombs (@CharCoombs1) reported 13 minutes ago

  @bmob719 @BristolCity If you’re paying using NatWest or TSB card you will have issues - been trying to renew our seats since Friday! There is a known issue but they don’t appear to communicating this!!

• 
  Ali@Makely (@MakelyStudio) reported 13 minutes ago

  10 years. 50M+ users. £11M+ revenue impact. Citibank. Mercedes. Sky. Virgin Media. NatWest. I spent a decade fixing conversion problems at companies most startups would kill to work with. what I learned: the same broken patterns show up everywhere - onboarding that loses people in the first 60 seconds, pricing pages that confuse instead of convert, signup flows with friction nobody ever fixed. now I build the same systems for funded startups.

• 
  Lorraine Morris (@MLorrM) reported 14 minutes ago

  In the case of Perks v NatWest Markets Plc (evidence given around 2022), Mr Neil Graham — a GRG director, chartered accountant and experienced banker — was cross-examined under oath about the bank’s RMP credit system entries for swap-related credit lines / contingent obligations (often referred to as CLU – Credit Line Utilisation). Key exchanges reported in the materials include: 🔹Mr Graham accepted that the credit-line entry on the RMP system represented the client’s contingent obligation. 🔹Mr Graham agreed it was a factor the bank used when considering in loan-to-value calculations for the overall connection. 🔹When asked whether it could push a connection over a loan-to-value ratio covenant, he answered (subject to market movements) yes. 🔹He further accepted that this could ultimately lead to the connection being transferred into GRG. 🔹Mr Graham is experienced and the testimony is truthful; however, as happened in Ireland - bank’s counsel later attempted to “distance the bank from this evidence in closing submissions”. 🔹Surprise, surprise but bank’s counsel is categorically misleading the Court. 🔹They characterised Graham’s answers as given “on the hoof,” - said it was not his specialist area and submitted that he was wrong on the LTV impact point. 🔹They argued the bank did not accept that the CLU had the effect claimed and that there was no duty to volunteer information about it to the customer. 🔹This was what bank counsel is required to do to keep the charade going and that they cavalierly do so is a scandal in itself. 🔹Mr Graham’s testimony exists and is on the public record, as circulated by campaigners and referenced in related presentations. 🔹So, a senior bank director & chartered accountant with a GRG/risk-adjacent role did accept under oath that the credit line could cause or contribute to an LTV breach and subsequent transfer into GRG. 🔹This is rather obvious and is in fact why the products were sold in the first instance - as confirmed by numerous insiders. 🔹NatWest’s formal position in that case (and more generally) has been to treat such lines as “internal risk measures” rather than customer-facing hard liabilities that automatically breach covenants in the way alleged, and to reject the broader fraud characterisation. But that would be their formal position would it not? When billions of euros is at stake? 🔹Meanwhile customers faced enormous break costs & this fact alone is wholly inconsistent with the characterisation of the credit line as a purely internal risk measure. 🔹It is however consistent with the reality, which is that the bank had booked (and later crystallised) an exposure against their customers and the credit line had been concealed. 🔹That bank counsel filed pleadings that falsely characterised these structures as just fixing an interest rate or just ordinary fixed-rate loans, facilitating the burying of the misrepresentations under layers of legal process - is a further scandal - akin to that whereby the lawyers who managed to lock up innocent sub-postmasters on foot of unsound evidence. 🔹The result for Irish SMEs duped by theses practices was a systematic extraction of value from those SMEs - while the guilty institution and its lawyers ensured that accountability remained permanently out of reach. @ArturNadol7566 @Wftproof

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  Jobie (@JobieTwits) reported 17 minutes ago

  @johntierney73 @NnatMmac @NatWest I worked in fraud for a bank. It is possible. You gave your pin to someone or set it to something they could work out, and they had your card. There are other ways like they had access to your Internet banking which told them your pin but that’s less likely due to 2FA.